Resource type - Revision history

TiberiusB at 18:49, 25 September 2026

2026-09-25T18:49:44Z

TiberiusB at 19:42, 19 April 2026

2026-04-19T19:42:02Z

TiberiusB: /* Behavior of resources */

2026-03-13T07:53:35Z

Behavior of resources

TiberiusB: /* From a production process perspective */

2026-03-13T07:52:13Z

From a production process perspective

TiberiusB: /* Reliability */

2026-03-13T07:50:24Z

Reliability

TiberiusB: /* Scope */

2026-03-13T07:46:42Z

Scope

TiberiusB: /* Availability */

2026-03-13T07:45:59Z

Availability

TiberiusB: /* Reliability */

2026-03-13T07:34:34Z

Reliability

TiberiusB: /* Transferability */

2026-03-13T07:31:35Z

Transferability

TiberiusB: /* Availability */

2026-03-13T07:29:38Z

Availability

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 Physical spaces can have various functions: storage, working, transit, etc. They possess features that make them more or less suitable for a particular process: size, [[location]]/proximity, accessibility, security, ventilation, layout or plan, etc. They can come under various property regimes: private (including shared ownership), shared, condominium.
-Building a new space is an important activity that needs be incentivised. If there are no incentives to drive it almost everyone will wait for others to do it. This behavior has been observed in [[Sensorica]]. [[Tibi]] proposed to create a [[venture]] and form a group around this activity, with the goal to deliver the space to the community. The [[deliverable]] of this team is the space, which would go to a [[custodian]] to be administered according to a charter adopted by [[active affiliates]]. During the process, those involved in the ''building a space'' [[activity]], which is an infrastructure development [[type of activity]], will log their [[contributions]]. These [[contributions]] can be in time (meetings, documentation, giving presentations, visiting, etc.) in cash (paying for rent, repairs, etc.), in materials (sharing renovation tools with the group for repairs and maintenance, etc.). The promise is that once the space will generate [[ventures]] that in turn generate [[revenue]], the initial [[investment]] will be rewarded. There are different ways to reward this initial [[investment]]. [[Tibi]] proposed one '''guiding principle''': those who invest in infrastructure development cannot hope to get a % from all commercially successful [[ventures]] using this infrastructure, for as long as they exist, because this kind of investment has a great multiplication factor that makes is unjust compared to [[contributions]] to [[ventures]] (for example, writing a document that helps infrastructure development or writing a document that helps an R&D project, in the second case the contribution generates [[fluid equity]] for one [[venture]], in the first, for all [[ventures]]).
+Building a new space is an important activity that needs be incentivised. If there are no incentives to drive it almost everyone will wait for others to do it. This behavior has been observed in [[Sensorica]]. [[Tibi]] proposed to create a [[venture]] and form a group around this activity, with the goal to deliver the space to the community. The [[deliverable]] of this team is the space, which would go to a [[custodian]] to be administered according to a charter adopted by [[active affiliates]]. During the process, those involved in the ''building a space'' [[activity]], which is an infrastructure development [[type of activity]], will log their [[contributions]]. These [[contributions]] can be in time (meetings, documentation, giving presentations, visiting, etc.) in cash (paying for rent, repairs, etc.), in materials (sharing renovation tools with the group for repairs and maintenance, etc.). The promise is that once the space will generate [[ventures]] that in turn generate [[benefits]], the initial [[contribution]] will be rewarded. There are different ways to reward this initial [[contribution]]. [[Tibi]] proposed one '''guiding principle''': those who contribute in infrastructure development cannot hope to get a % from all commercially successful [[ventures]] using this infrastructure, for as long as they exist, because this kind of contribution has a great multiplication factor that makes is unjust compared to [[contributions]] to [[ventures]] (for example, writing a document that helps infrastructure development or writing a document that helps an R&D project, in the second case the contribution generates [[fluid equity]] for one [[venture]], in the first, for all [[ventures]]).
 One way to reward infrastructure development contributions is to calculate the market equivalent price (ex. if spent one hour doing something, how much the labor market would reward for the same hour of the same activity?) and whenever the new space becomes sustainable to be repaid back the equivalent plus x%, which represents the risk incurred. The x% is fixed based on supply and demand: it is slowly raised until enough resources become available to build the space.

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 This distinction is very important from a resource stewardship and governance standpoint. Resources that are part of the [[commons]] are in the public domain and are accessible by everyone on this planet. There is no governance around them. Some licenses governing use might be formulated.
-The use of material resources that are part of the [[pool of shareables]] and that have high maintenance costs needs to be regulated. Other material resources, like equipment, require some level of training. Some form of governance needs to be put in place. Moreover, a resource management system needs to be put in place to monitor their ware and tare, as well as their whereabouts, allocation, etc.
+The use of material resources that are part of the [[pool of shareables]] and that have high maintenance costs needs to be regulated. Other material resources, like equipment, require some level of training. Some form of governance needs to be put in place. Moreover, a [[resource]] management system needs to be put in place to monitor their ware and tare, as well as their whereabouts, [[allocation]], etc.
 Resources owned by affiliates or partners of the network are governed by rules imposed by the owner. The community might also impose some generic rules on them.

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 ** sense of community (animate, inject purpose, help, nurture a sense of community)
 ** trust (by members in the value network, in all the risk metrics used, in evaluation processes, in sustainability, in the ethical fabric of the OVN, by users with respect with usable artifacts, services, future improvements, continuity, compatibility)
 =Reliability=

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 In [[NDO]], the most significant gaps here are ''Method'' (documented processes, recipes, protocols) and ''Space'' (physical locations with governance, scheduling, and access control needs). Both are important in [[commons-based peer production]] settings.
-* ''Method'' resources are particularly interesting in the NDO context: a fabrication method (how to assemble a CNC machine) is a ''non-rivalrous'' ''digital'' resource, it can be copied freely. But it is also a ''governance-bearing'' resource: it defines the conditions under which physical resources should be used, encoding safety requirements, quality standards, and attribution requirements. In NDO terms, a Method would be a ''Digital NDO'' whose Layer 1 (specification) includes both the documented process and governance rules referencing it.
+* ''Method'' resources are particularly interesting in the [[NDO]] context: a fabrication method (how to assemble a CNC machine) is a ''non-rivalrous'' ''digital'' resource, it can be copied freely. But it is also a ''governance-bearing'' resource: it defines the conditions under which physical resources should be used, encoding safety requirements, quality standards, and attribution requirements. In [[NDO]] terms, a Method would be a ''Digital NDO'' whose Layer 1 (specification) includes both the documented process and governance rules referencing it.
 * ''Space'' resources are rivalrous (only a few agents can use it at the same time) and require scheduling/booking mechanics. A future generic [[NDO]] should be able to express temporal availability as a dimension of resource governance.
 ==Accessibility==

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:50, 13 March 2026
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−	'''Complexity economics note''': In information theory, reliability is a measure of ''signal-to-noise ratio''. A governance system that cannot distinguish reliable from unreliable resources is processing high-noise information, i.e. it cannot direct maintenance effort, access restrictions, or replacement decisions to where they are most needed.	+	'''Complexity economics note''': Reliability matters because it is information. In a P2P system with no central quality control, agents making decisions about which resources to access, which tools to borrow, which methods to follow, need reliable information about the track record of those resources. A resource with a high failure rate imposes hidden costs on the network, missed deadlines, wasted materials, unsafe working conditions. Making reliability visible and queryable converts hidden costs into explicit governance inputs. In information theory, reliability is a measure of ''signal-to-noise ratio''. A governance system that cannot distinguish reliable from unreliable resources is processing high-noise information, i.e. it cannot direct maintenance effort, access restrictions, or replacement decisions to where they are most needed.

	=Related to use of physical resources=		=Related to use of physical resources=

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 * '''Network specific''': some resources are intended for a wider domain, for a group of [[ventures]] or for an entire network constituted around a broader mission like [[Sensorica]]. Examples: a website used by the entire network, like [www.sensorica.co Sensorica's website], or a microscope that can be used for many [[ventures]] by [[affiliates]] of a network.
 * '''Public''': some resources can benefit the entire world. This is the case of commons: designs, documented methods, etc.
 ==Property regime==

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 Rivalry determines optimal [[governance]] strategy more directly than any other property. ''Non-rivalrous'' resources should default to ''open access'' (information wants to be free); ''rivalrous'' resources require access scheduling, usage tracking, and maintenance governance.
-'''Complexity economics note''': Benkler's entire argument for [[commons-based peer production]] rests on the distinction between rivalrous and non-rivalrous resources. A P2P [[governance]] system that does not formally model this distinction will produce governance rules that are either too restrictive for non-rival resources (inefficient) or too permissive for rival resources (destructive).
+'''Complexity economics note''':
 ==Transferability==

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:34, 13 March 2026
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	Reliability is a fact like [[Reputation]] for [[agents]] and can be taken into consideration by systems of prioritization, choice of a resource to be included into a process. Reliability should also reflect desirability, and perhaps cost of use. Cost of use can be justified for highly reliable resources, because they require maintenance.		Reliability is a fact like [[Reputation]] for [[agents]] and can be taken into consideration by systems of prioritization, choice of a resource to be included into a process. Reliability should also reflect desirability, and perhaps cost of use. Cost of use can be justified for highly reliable resources, because they require maintenance.
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		+	'''Complexity economics note''': In information theory, reliability is a measure of ''signal-to-noise ratio''. A governance system that cannot distinguish reliable from unreliable resources is processing high-noise information, i.e. it cannot direct maintenance effort, access restrictions, or replacement decisions to where they are most needed.

	=Related to use of physical resources=		=Related to use of physical resources=

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:31, 13 March 2026
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	There is is an opportunity for tools like NRP-CAS to chase after and define metrics or metacurrencies for valuables that are not transferable or tradeable.		There is is an opportunity for tools like NRP-CAS to chase after and define metrics or metacurrencies for valuables that are not transferable or tradeable.
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		+	'''Complexity economics note''': Transferability determines what kind of market or exchange system applies to a resource. Non-transferable resources require non-market coordination mechanisms (gifting, contribution tracking, reputation systems).

	==Quantifiability==		==Quantifiability==

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 * '''Rivalrous''' - access to use is limited by other use, access can be restricted
 * '''Non-rivalrous''' - multiple agents can have use access to the same resource at the same time.
 ==Transferability==